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Abstract:
I investigate the impact of pollution generated from the utilization of exhaustible
resources in the endogenous growth model. The endogenous model is an appro-
priate treatment of technological change in analyzing a long-term growth with a
constraint of polluting non-renewable resources. Under this model, I consider the
relationship between environmental policies and technological change. The en-
vironmental policies are found to induce technological change which can avoid
the depletion of exhaustible resources and the deterioration of the environment. I
extensively discuss two approaches focusing on endogenous technological change.
Although both approaches are formulated with the constraint of resources and fo-
cus on the negative externality, they lead to strikingly different results. An approach
by Schou [2000] concludes that an environmental policy is unnecessary since the
market behaves optimally. The other approach by Grimaud and Rouge [2005] con-
cludes that the market shows a distortion at the equilibrium and an environmental
policy instrument be introduced to correct it. In this approach, it is shown that the
growth rate of tax impacts price, quantities, and growth rates.
Finally, I examine the current state of environmental policies that aim to miti-
gate, and adapt to, climate change, by presenting examples of environmental policy
tools.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I analyze the possibility of positive long term growth with resource
scarcity and the need for an environmental instrument. In the twenty first century,
it is inevitable for humans to solve two problems closely intertwined and both
fundamental to economic prosperity. First, growth precipitates the depletion of
exhaustible energy resources. This has led some individuals particularly concerned
with the possibility that zero growth was a only sustainable long-run objective.
Second, growth induces a deterioration of the environment such as climate change
by global greenhouse gas (GHG) emission. As a consequence, how to reduce the
pollution caused by the consumption of resources and how to achieve long-run
growth rate are among the most pressing policy challenges facing the world today
[Acemoglu et al., 2009].
A pledging action to achieve national GHG emission reduction targets under the
UNFCCC at Copenhagen and Cancun was an important first step by countries
in finding a global solution. The countries which signed the convention have
agreed to work collectively to achieve the ultimate objective: stabilization of GHG-
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference of the climate system (Article 2, UNFCC). In 2005, the Kyoto
Protocol entered into force and created a legal obligation to limit or reduce their
GHG emission between 2008 and 2020 to within agreed emission levels [OECD,
2011a].
Despite some progress in global cooperation, in order to tackle climate change the
economies worldwide have to go through transformations in terms of energy pro-
duction, consumption, transportation, and agricultural patterns. The transition to a
low-carbon, climate resilient economy will require significant investment in miti-
gation and adaptation and a shift of investment from fossil fuels and conventional
technologies to newer, cleaner technologies and less carbon-intensive infrastruc-
ture [OECD, 2011a]. This adaptation appears in growth models as technological
change. This is why technological change is an important question in modeling.
In a same vein, recent research has focused on the interaction between long-run
growth and environmental problems. The complex and salient questions remain-
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ing in climate change policy modeling is the appropriate treatment of technological
change [Gillingham et al., 2008]. The approach to modeling technological change
is widely considered to be one of the most important determinants of climate pol-
icy analysis in terms of estimating the costs of regulation. There are two main
approaches of analysis; the exogenous growth model1 and the endogenous growth
model2. Many authors in literatures have presented solutions with the endogenous
growth model rather than with the exogenous model. I am going to analyze dif-
ferences between the two models, first, to choose the appropriate approach instead
of taking the endogenous model as granted to diagnose the possibility of long run
growth. Then, the role of endogenous innovation in mitigating the resource scarcity
will be discussed.
In an endogenous growth model, the following question is still raised: does endoge-
nous growth overcome environmental problems in the form of pollution, allowing
economic growth to be sustained at a positive rate indefinitely? If the unregulated
market economy achieves the optimal extraction of non-renewable resources and
growth rates, any intervention may not be necessary. Otherwise, an environmental
instrument should be imposed to make the economy behave optimally.
Policies to foster technological change can be categorized into two approaches:
command-and-control approach and a market-based one. For example, pollution
charges, subsidies, and tradable permits are well known market-based instruments.
It can encourage firms or individuals to make efforts to reduce pollution on the
basis of their own interests. On the other hand, command-and-control regulations
force firms to take allocated shares of pollution-control burden mostly by setting
a uniform standard for the firms. In models with external polluting effects, an
emission tax will be introduced as an environmental policy.
The paper is organized as follows: first, I present that the approach of the endoge-
nous technological change is more plausible to explain the long-term growth and
cope with the problem of the resource scarcity than the exogenous technological
change is. In Sections 4 and 5, I introduce two interesting papers with the endoge-
nous growth model. Both of them introduce the constraint of the resources and
1This model takes the rate of technological change as being determined exogenously, by noneco-
nomic forces.
2In this model, technology is an endogenous variable, determined within the economic system.
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focus on the negative externality; pollution. The pollution affects two targets: the
production process and the household’s utility. Schou [2000] analyzes the effects
on the first target while Grimaud and Rouge [2005] consider the other, leading to a
significantly different conclusion.
In the framework of Schou [2000], the environmental policy is unnecessary since
the market does not behave sub-optimally. On the other hand, Grimaud and Rouge
[2005] conclude that there is a difference between the optimum and equilibrium.
This is interpreted as non-optimality. To bring equilibrium conditions closer to
optimality, the environmental instruments should be levied. In this context, it is
shown that Hotelling rule is not a pure efficiency condition anymore.
In Section 6 an environmental policy is aimed to correct the distortion at the equi-
librium. It is found that a decreasing tax levied on the resource extraction yields
the optimum, not the tax level. Finally, Section 7 is devoted to comparing two
models of Schou [2000] and Grimaud and Rouge [2005]. Furthermore, I examine
some of the empirical research to disclose the effect of an environmental policy
and the policy instruments currently adopted in many industrialized countries to
tackle climate change.
3
2 Literature Review
When the standard analysis of economic growth considers the fact that the non-
renewable natural resources are depleted over time, it raises a few questions: with
resource scarcity, can we induce stable growth in the long run, what is the opti-
mal growth path, and what is the appropriate environmental policy instrument to
achieve the optimal condition to correct the distortion introduced at the equilib-
rium?
There are two main types of models which have contributed to answer these ques-
tions. One is the Ramsey growth model for which Stiglitz [1974] or Dasgupta
and Heal [1979] can be quoted. Another strand is a group of endogenous growth
models. In a series of papers, Romer [1991], Schou [2000], Barbier [1999], and
Grimaud and Rouge [2005] have attempted to show that long-term positive growth
is possible with technological progress.
In the first type of models, the key optimal point is developed by the Hotelling rule.
Hotelling [1931] derives the rule of which the price of non-renewable resource
grows at the rate of interest in the equilibrium. The logic behind the Hotelling
rule is straightforward. A stock of natural resources is regarded as an asset in the
owner’s portfolio. If the growth rate of the resource price rises less than the interest
rate does, he will extract and sell the stock of natural resources to invest them to the
capital asset. On the other hand, if the growth rate of the resource price is greater
than the interest rate, the owner will leave the resources. Hence, the Hotelling rule
is verified at the equilibrium, where the equilibrium and optimal paths are identical.
Dasgupta and Heal [1979] point out that the elasticity of substitution between the
physical capital and the resource is an important factor. If this elasticity is below
unity, the output will tend towards zero in the end as the resource is exhausted.
If, on the other hand, it is greater than one, a consumption level, strictly greater
than zero, can be sustained infinitely. In the where case the elasticity is one, the
feasibility of long-run growth depends on the relative input shares of capital and
the resource.
The key feature of the endogenous growth model is that people must be given in-
centives to improve technology. There is good reason to believe that technological
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change depends on economic decisions, for it comes from industrial innovations
made by profit seeking firms and depends on the funding of science, the accumu-
lation of human capital, and other such economic activities.
For example, Barbier [1999] shows that technological progress offsets the prob-
lems caused by natural resource scarcity with the endogenous growth model. The
endogenous growth model presents a truly more optimistic view of the contribu-
tion that an economic policy can make for long-run growth, because the rate of
technological progress is determined by forces that are internal to the economic
system.
In spite of the assumption that endogenous technological change overcomes the
resource scarcity, there is one more key feature to be considered in the use of non-
renewable resources. The combustion of oil, coal and natural gas emits greenhouse
gas and causes the climate change. These negative byproducts raise a problem of
economic distortion. While the environmental degradation impacts the household’s
utility as well as humans’ welfare negatively as a whole, profit seeking firms do
not consider social problems when making a decision. An environmental policy,
therefore, is aimed at correcting the distortion introduced at the equilibrium.
Groth and Schou [2007] demonstrate that policies toward the returns to resource
conservation influence growth. It shows that a tax on resource use, such as a carbon
tax, matters when it is time-varying. In their framework, when it keeps declining
over time, it favors conservation and growth. They conclude that resource taxes are
decisive for long-run growth whereas traditional capital taxes and subsidies only
influence the level.
In [Golosov et al., 2011], the three main factors; damages, discounting, and de-
preciation, influence the social cost and optimal tax. Golosov et al. [2011] char-
acterize competitive market outcomes with and without taxes. In the model, the
optimal per-unit tax on emissions is set to equal to the marginal externality cost
of emissions. They assume that there are two sources of energy; oil and coal, and
that these are perfect substitutes. In their framework, oil is more efficient than coal,
extracted at zero cost, and is finite supply. Coal is extracted using labor (at constant
marginal cost) and is in infinite supply. According to their conclusion, the no-tax
market economy would empty oil supplies in three decades, while oil would be
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used for five decades with the optimal taxation.
Acemoglu et al. [2009] analyze endogenous and directed technical change in a
growth model with environmental constraints and limited resources. In the frame-
work of Acemoglu et al. [2009], research can be biased towards improving the
technology of machines. They characterize dynamic tax policies that achieve sus-
tainable growth or maximize inter-temporal welfare, as functions of the degree of
substitutability between clean and dirty inputs, environmental and resource stocks,
and cross-country technological spillovers.
Their framework highlights the central roles played by the market size and the
price effects3 on the direction of technical change. When the two inputs are strong
substitutes, redirecting technical change using a temporary policy intervention can
be sufficient to avoid a disaster. An important implication of the analysis in this
literature is that optimal environmental regulation should always use both a carbon
tax to control current emissions and research subsidies. They argue that the op-
timal policy relies less on a carbon tax and more on direct encouragement to the
development of clean technologies.
There has been a long discussion on different environmental instruments. The mar-
ket based instruments are generally regarded as more efficient in economic terms
than command and control measures. In a series of papers, Parry [1997], Fischer
et al. [2003], Montero [2002], and more recently Requate and Unold [2003] have
attempted to rank environmental policy instruments with respect to their incentive
to spur the adoption of advanced, low-polluting technologies.
Parry [1997] analyzes the welfare effect in the market for environmental R&D
induced by alternative environmental policy instruments. The induced welfare gain
is greater under the emission tax than the tradable emission permit. However, he
finds that the empirical significance of this discrepancy crucially depends on the
potential size of innovation. In addition, he shows that the efficiency discrepancies
between the emission tax and the fixed performance standard are somewhat larger,
although again they are very sensitive to the potential size of innovation.
Fischer et al. [2003] find that an unambiguous ranking of policy instruments is
3The market size effect encourages innovation towards the larger input sector, while the price
effect directs innovation towards the sector with higher price.
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not possible. Rather, the ranking of policy instruments depends on the innovator’s
ability to appropriate spillover benefits of new technologies to other firms, the costs
of innovation, environmental benefit functions and the number of firms producing
pollutants. Montero [2002] compares instruments under noncompetitive circum-
stances and finds that the result is less clear than under perfect competition. Stan-
dards and taxes yield higher incentives for R&D when the market is characterized
by Cournot competition, but the opposite holds when the market is characterized
by Bertrand competition.
Finally, Requate and Unold [2003] demonstrate that the comparison of environ-
mental policies leads to quite different results if the number of firms which adopt
new technology is determined endogenously through equilibrium considerations.
In the case where the regulator makes long-term commitments to policy levels and
does not anticipate the arrival of new technology, taxes provide stronger incentives
than permits. Auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives, while standards
may give stronger incentive than permits. On the other hand, when the regulator
anticipates new technologies, the paper shows that the regulator can induce the
first-best outcome with taxes and permits if he moves after firms have invested,
whereas this does not hold if he moves first.
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3 Exogenous or Endogenous Technological Change?
One of the most complicated and critical questions in environmental policy mod-
eling is the proper treatment of technological change. The endogenous technol-
ogy change implies that it incorporates a feedback mechanism by which policy
encourages clean production. This feedback occurs through energy prices, R&D
activities or accumulated production experience (learning-by-doing). In contrast,
the exogenous technological change is in line with that the technological progress
is independent of economic forces or policy. Then, the starting point is to take the
differences of these approaches into account and find the appropriate perspective
for environmental policy modeling [Gillingham et al., 2008].
3.1 Exogenous Technological Change
The neoclassical model4 takes the rate of technological change as being determined
exogenously by non-economic forces. Solow [1956] and Swan [1956] first built
this model. They show that economic policy can boost an economy’s growth rate
by inducing households to save more.
However, the model leads to the pessimistic long-run result of which an increase
in growth can not last indefinitely. This is because the marginal productivity is
diminishing, given the state of technology. Then, how can the persistent long-
run growth that has been observed be explained? Technological change gives an
answer implying that it continually offsets the effect of diminishing returns.
The aggregate production function can be written as F (K,AL) where A is an
exogenous productivity parameter that reflects the current state of technological
progress and this parameter grows at the constant exponential rate g. It assumes
that the exogenous value of g reflects progress in science. It allows the stock of
capital to grow indefinitely because the effect of diminishing returns is now offset
by the continual rise in productivity.
However, the main limitation of the neoclassical model is not to account for the rate
of technological progress which can specify the scientific discovery and diffusion
4The Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey model is derived in Appendix A.
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in the industry. Since the rate of technological progress is exogenously given, one
can not analyze how environmental degradation can affect technological change
and how technological change can be directed by policy to be more environmental
friendly.
3.2 Endogenous Technological Change
Industrial innovation is induced by profit seeking firms and depends on the fund-
ing of science and the accumulation of human capital. The environmental issues
caused by the utilization of the exhaustible resources can make effects on techno-
logical progress in an attempt to meet the needs of consumers and a society. In
this sense, the endogenous innovation might alleviate resource scarcity and sustain
growth in the long run.
However, a few questions still remain: how does the endogenous growth overcome
increasing resource scarcity which constrains innovation? Can the stable growth
be induced with this constraint, and which environmental policy should be imple-
mented to avoid environmental disasters in the long run? First of all, I introduce
endogenous approaches for measuring technological change and discuss the crit-
ical aspects of the process of technological change. Furthermore, I diagnose if
endogenous technological change can overcome resource scarcity.
The innovation is carried out primarily in private firms. A successful innovation
becomes available to other firms and individuals in related fields, of which the
process is called diffusion. With the induced innovation approach, firms invest
to the new technology actively to produce profitable new products and processes.
This decision is made by the firms’ efforts to maximize their value, and it affects
the overall rate of technology change. For instance, it occurs through energy prices,
R&D activities or accumulated production experience of lowering costs.
Considering that the induced innovation rests on a profit-motivated investment ac-
tivity, it can be assumed that the level and direction of the innovation respond to the
change in relative prices. According to the assumption, the environmental policy
which induces more expensive price of inputs can have impacts on technological
change toward, for example, carbon-saving technology change.
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Furthermore, the amount of induced innovation can be a criterion to evaluate dif-
ferent policy instruments. From this perspective, the induced innovation literature
focuses on the potential for an environmental policy to give incentives adopting
advanced technology through innovation. Then, how is the technological change
made endogenous? What can we learn from these approaches? I aim to incorporate
endogenous technological change to specify models for an environmental policy by
providing the existing endogenous specification. Moreover, my review is restricted
to select papers that illustrate key concepts and provide insight into the theoretical
basis for the methodology of modeling endogenous technological change.
Although it is not easy to categorize neatly, the most commonly used approaches
of endogenous technological change are direct price-induced, R&D-induced and
learning-induced approaches. Direct price-induced technological change means
that changes in relative prices can bring forth a new technology to minimize the cost
of production. R&D-induced technological change implies that R&D investment
affects the rate and direction of technological change. Finally, learning-induced
technological change implies that the unit cost of a technology becomes a decreas-
ing function as the experience with the technology is accumulated.
3.2.1 Direct Price-Induced Technological Change
The theory of induced innovation has been strengthened by a number of empirical
studies. According to the empirical evidence, the price-induced form of techno-
logical change partly can explain why higher energy prices are inclined to extract
faster improvements in energy efficiency. In particular, as the price of energy in-
creases, price-induced technological change will result in greater energy efficiency
in modeling the climate of policy.
For example, Newell et al. [1999] find that historically the increase in the price
of energy accounts for one-quarter to one-half of the observed improvements in
energy efficiency for consumer durables from 1958 to 1993. Popp [2002] finds
that patenting in energy-related fields increases in response to the increased energy
prices. In addition, Popp [2005] finds the interaction between technological change
and environmental policy from the empirical literature. According to the result, in-
novation responds to incentives, exogenous technological change does not capture
10
the nature of technological change, and the social return to environmental research
is high.
However, the reduced-form approach largely has been passed over for the R&D
or learning-induced technological change methodologies. I now turn to those ap-
proaches in more detail.
3.2.2 R&D-Induced Technological Change
One of the most common approaches to modeling endogenous technological change
is R&D-induced technological change. A number of literatures have focused on
this approach. The endogenous-growth literature (see, e.g., Romer [1991], Aghion
and Howitt [1998] and Acemoglu [1998]) shows that it is important to include a
stock of knowledge capital in modeling economic growth. The stock of knowledge
can, in a broad range, include information, skills, and experience in production.
There are three key points in this approach. One is whether R&D-induced techno-
logical change is relevant to an innovation market imperfection because of spillovers.
Another is whether R&D-induced technological change on the purpose of reduc-
ing carbon emission crowds out R&D in other industries. Finally, the other one is
whether there exists a substitutability or complementarity between the generation
of output and the generation of new knowledge [Gillingham et al., 2008].
For the last issue the elasticity of supply of additional R&D plays an important
role in R&D activity. If the supply of R&D is relatively inelastic, more effort on
carbon saving R&D will result in crowding out R&D activity in other sectors. This
behavior of firms has been shown in several models. Nordhaus [2002] as well as
Goulder and Schneider [1999] present that environmental policy instruments, such
as a subsidy or tax, will decrease R&D and aggregate economic output in the case
where there is a relatively inelastic supply of R&D.
Another critical point is the spillover effect. Specifically, it is the degree to which
firms fail to achieve the full benefits from investment in R&D. It means that social
returns to R&D are relatively high. If a firm is able to obtain most of benefits from
the R&D investment, the incentive to undertake the R&D will increase, and the
social returns of the R&D will converge with the private returns of a firm. On the
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other hand, if a firm makes less profits from the R&D, it will be less inclined to
undertake R&D, and high social returns will take place due to spillover effects.
There exists a tension between spillovers and crowding out; the former one points
out that when endogenous technological change is included, more cost saving can
be achieved, whereas the latter one dampens that effect.
3.2.3 Learning-Induced Technological Change
This approach is often described as learning-by-doing (LBD). LBD can be repre-
sented by the learning curves showing how much a unit cost decreases as a func-
tion of experience. The curve intuitively explains the process of learning which
influences production. If more experience with one technology is accumulated,
its production cost will be lower, and the technology becomes more competitive,
resulting in even more accumulated experience.
However, in modeling LBD it is difficult to characterize the underlying mecha-
nisms even though it is intuitively understandable. In spite of its disadvantages, the
manageability of learning curves has led to the use of the model based on learning-
induced technological change. A common result of including endogenous techno-
logical change is that the lower level of carbon tax is needed in models with LBD
to achieve carbon mitigation target than in those without LBD.
This result is also intuitive. According to LBD models, R&D expenditure for abate-
ment is not required, and any additional capacity of technologies reducing carbon
emissions will decrease the costs of that technology as time goes by, leading to
more emissions reduction per unit cost.
There are limitations of each approach to choose the best which corresponds to the
purpose and structure of the model and to make assumptions. However, my focus
is to show that it is more plausible to build a growth model including endogenous
technological change rather than one without it. When technological change is
not considered, it tends to overestimate the level of imposing environmental policy
instruments [Popp, 2004].
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4 Optimal Growth without Environmental Policy
Stiglitz [1974] and Romer [1991] have developed an endogenous growth model
incorporating exhaustible resource depletion. The model demonstrates that inno-
vation is endogenously determined by economic forces and endogenous growth
overcomes resource scarcity. It implies that sustainable growth can be achieved in
the long run even with the condition of natural resource scarcity.
In this section, the baseline framework proposed by Schou [2000] is introduced.
Schou [2000] examines how the utilization of the exhaustible resources causing
pollution affects the growth in economy. The pollution is considered to affect the
production process negatively. For example, the climate change caused by green-
house gas emission may influence production in agricultural sector. In this model,
the source of endogenous growth is the continuous and proportional increase in
human capital.
Next, I discuss how flow pollution problems will diminish over time as the econ-
omy moves along the balanced growth path. Furthermore, it is analyzed why the
result is counter-intuitive that an unregulated market economy will behave opti-
mally with a negative externality.
4.1 The Model
I consider the following standard specifications. At time t, production Yt depends
on physical capital Kt, the share ut of its time that the labor force Lt spends in
production, the average human capital level ht, the use of the exhaustible resource
Rt, and pollution Pt caused by the resource extraction. Physical capital Kt, labor
Lt and the non-renewable resources Rt in the production function exhibit constant
returns to scale:
Yt = AtK
α
t (uthtLt)
βRγt P
−δ
t h
θ
t (1)
with
A,α, β, γ, δ, θ ≥ 0 and α+ β + γ = 1,
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where θ is a possible positive externality from the average human capital level on
the productivity, and δ is a negative pollution externality.
It is assumed that the elasticity of the pollution function with respect to resource
use is constant. The pollution function follows
Pt = DR
λ
t , (2)
where D > 0 and λ > 0.
Moreover, I impose the assumption that the positive effects of the resource utiliza-
tion to production outweighs its negative effects, γ > δλ. The production function
implies that the flow of pollution affects productivity in the economy negatively.
The production is consumed partly by the representative household and invested
partly in capital goods with the initial capital K0:
K˙t = Yt − CtLt, (3)
where Ct is per capita consumption. Human capital is accumulated linearly de-
pending on time spent on education with the initial human capital h0:
h˙t = κ(1− ut)ht, (4)
where κ > 0. The resource is extracted from an initial finite stock S0, and the
standard resource stock law of motion is given by
S˙t = −Rt. (5)
4.1.1 The Optimal Solution
The utility of the representative household only depends on consumption, and it is
not affected by pollution in this model. The utility function is iso-elastic:
When  > 0, ρ > 0 and  6= 1,
max
∫ ∞
0
C1−t − 1
1−  e
−ρtLtdt,
and when  = 1 and ρ > 0,
max
∫ ∞
0
logCte
−ρtLtdt,
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where ρ and  are the constant rate of time preference and the inverse of the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution, respectively.
In this case, individuals have the same elasticity of substitution 1 between present
and future consumption no matter the level of consumption. This is the key param-
eter defining the household’s desire to smooth consumption over time, and in this
class of utility that desire is independent of the level of consumption.
The social planner will maximize the utility of the representative households by
maximizing the following Hamiltonian:
C1−t
1− Lt + µt
[
AtK
α
t (uthtLt)
βRγt P
−δ
t h
θ
t − CtLt
]
− νtRt + ηt(1− ut)κht.
Taking first-order conditions for an interior optimal solution with respect to the
three control variables (ct, ut and Rt) and the three state variables (Kt, St and ht)
are given as follows:
Ct =µt, (6)
νt =µt(γ − δλ) Yt
Rt
, (7)
µtβYt
ut
=ηtκht, (8)
µ˙t
µt
=ρ− α Yt
Kt
, (9)
ν˙t
νt
=ρ, (10)
η˙t
ηt
=ρ− (β + θ)µtYt
ηtht
− (1− ut)κ, (11)
where µt, νt and ηt are the shadow values of physical capital, the natural resource
and human capital respectively. In order to maximize the utility, the social planner
will choose variables Ct, ut and Rt to satisfy the conditions from (6) to (11) and
transversality conditions5:
lim
t→∞µtKte
−ρt =0, (12)
lim
t→∞ νtSte
−ρt =0, (13)
lim
t→∞ ηthte
−ρt =0, (14)
5It states that either capital stock and the natural resource must be zero or it must be valueless.
That is, you must not plan to die leaving anything valuable unconsumed.
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where Kt ≥ 0, St ≥ 0, and ht ≥ 0. Along the balanced growth path, Yt, Kt and
Ct must have the same growth rate which is denoted by g. From (4), it is known
that ut must be constant (= u) if ht grows with a constant rate. By differentiating
logarithmically with respect to time in (6)–(8) in the steady-state, the following
identities are obtained:
−g =gµ, (15)
gν =gµ + g − gR, (16)
gµ + g =gη + gh. (17)
When the growth rates are analyzed in the steady-state, the subscript t of the cor-
responding variable is omitted.
Differentiating with respect to time in the production function (1) in the steady-
state and considering (2) yields
g =
β + θ
β + γ
gh +
γ − δλ
β + γ
gR. (18)
Consequently, the steady-state growth rate for production of basic goods is
g =
(β + θ)κ− (β + γ − δλ)ρ
δλ+ (β + γ − δλ) . (19)
The growth rate of human capital follows
gh =
(β + θ)(β + γ + (1− )δλ)κ− β(β + γ)ρ
(β + γ)(δλ+ (β + γ − δλ)) . (20)
The growth rate of human capital is derived based on the assumption that labor
spends time in both on education activities and the production. It implies that the
growth rate of human capital is always positive, but less than the highest possible
value κ, when the share of time spent in production u is zero. Therefore, (20)
should satisfy the condition:
0 < (β + θ)(β + γ + (1− )δλ)κ− β(β + γ)ρ
< (β + θ)(δλ+ (β + γ − δλ))κ, (21)
since
0 < gh < κ.
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This implies that it is required to have appropriate values of parameters  and ρ.
 ≥ 1 is a sufficient condition to hold the right inequality sign. According to the
condition, the growth rate of resource extraction will be negative:
gR =
(1− )(β + θ)κ− (β + γ)ρ
δλ+ (β + γ − δλ) (22)
For the derivations of (19), (20) and (22), see Appendix B.
Note that g is always smaller than gh when there is no positive externality from
the average human capital level on the productivity (θ = 0). In addition, gh is
constrained to be positive given (21), but the sign of g is not determined. It means
that if the representative household values more current consumption relative to
future consumption and the elasticity of the exhaustible resource in production
is relatively large, the long-run growth rate of consumption g will be negative.
In this case, although the stock of knowledge increases as people keep educating
themselves, the positive impact on the production will be offset by the drain in the
resource stock.
This is in line with Stiglitz [1974]. The presence of a resource in fixed supply
that is indispensable in production does not necessarily imply that production will
eventually go towards zero, when there is technological potential that can offset
the negative influence of the resource. However, the optimality of declining con-
sumption in the long run remains a possibility, depending on the relative size of the
parameters representing discounting of the future on the one hand, and technology
on the other hand.
4.1.2 Comparative Optimal Growth
The effect of the resource scarcity on the growth rate of consumption g can be seen
by taking derivative with respect to γ:
∂g
∂γ
=
−(κ(β + θ) + δλρ)
(δλ+ (β + γ − δλ))2 < 0. (23)
Here, the level of γ indicates the importance of the resource in production. It is
found that the resource should be saved to avoid exhausting it completely in finite
time as the less input of the resource will lead to a negative effect to growth. The
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negative effect is larger, the more important is the natural resource in the production
technology.
When it comes to δ, the effect of an increase in δ on g will be
∂g
∂δ
=
λ((− 1)(β + θ)κ+ (β + γ)ρ)
(δλ+ (β + γ − δλ))2 > 0. (24)
Notice that the more important the negative impact of pollution on production, the
larger long-run growth rate will be. Also, the larger the size of γ, the smaller the
growth rate of production. δ affects the production in an opposite way, reducing the
positive contribution of the resource to production. If δ rises, the non-renewable
resource will be used less overtime. It will lead to not only the positive productivity
effect from utilizing the resource but also less negative effect of pollution to the
economy.
A higher value of δ means that the detrimental impacts on the growth rate of the
consumption, caused by the need to keep diminishing resource extraction, will
decrease. As a sequence, the growth rate of Yt will increase. This result opens the
possibility for the long-run sustainable growth in the finite resource stock.
The analysis, therefore, shows that the environmental problem by pollution will
diminish over time, and the larger is the negative impact of pollution (a rise in δ)
on the production, the higher the growth rate of Yt will be.
At last, the influence of δ on the growth rate of human capital and resource extrac-
tion will be following:
∂gR
∂δ
=
β + θ
β
∂gh
∂δ
=
−gR(1− )λ
δλ+ (β + γ − δλ) . (25)
The effect of parameter δ is depicted in Table 3. If  is large, the economy will
invest less in education and extract the resource more to make current generations
better off. On the other hand, if  is small, more patient agents invest more in
education and concern preservation of the resource for future .
4.2 The Market Case
In the market economy, each firm does not consider pollution. A single firm has a
negligible impact on the environment. It also does not take into account the positive
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 < 1  = 1  > 1
∂gR
∂δ > 0 = 0 < 0
∂gY
∂δ = 0
Table 3: Property of the growth rate of human capital and resource
effect of the average human capital level on the production. By analyzing the case
where the utilization of resource causes pollution, and there is no positive external
effect from human capital (δ > 0 and θ = 0), it can be diagnosed if the market
economy achieves the optimum. It will also show if it is necessary to implement
an environmental instrument such as taxes.
The resource owners maximize their profits by setting that the price of the resource
is equal to its marginal product. On the competitive natural resource market, the
maximization of the profit yields the standard equilibrium “Hotelling rule”:
rtpt = p˙t, (26)
where rt is the interest rate, and pt is the price of one unit of the resource. The
resource owners must be indifferent between selling the resource and keeping it in
the ground. It implies that the rate of return to selling the resource and investing the
revenues at the rate rt is equal to the price rise if the resource is kept in the ground.
In the market equilibrium, the initial resource price will adjust instantaneously to
the unique value which ensures that the resource is exhausted exactly as time goes
to infinity [Dasgupta and Heal, 1979].
In the market, the price of the resource is higher than its social value since only the
positive effect on production is taken into consideration, not the externality from
pollution. To see if it affects the extraction rate of the resource, (7) is modified as
follows:
νt = µtγ
Yt
Rt
. (27)
The first-order condition of the Hamiltonian to maximize the utility of the repre-
sentative household is the same as before (with θ = 0). Using (27), the same
growth rates in production (19), human capital (20), and resource (22) are derived.
It can be seen by that differentiating (7) and (27) with respect to time leads to the
19
same result (16). Therefore, without the consideration of the externality the inter-
temporal distortion in the resource extraction will not take place. It implies that the
market achieves the socially optimal condition.
The consequence is based on the fact that the total resource is finite and the as-
sumption that the net contribution of a unit of the resource to production is always
positive, considering the externality (γ > δλ). As a result, all the resource stock
will be exhausted in both cases of the social planner and the market economy. Ac-
cording to this, the allocation of the whole resource extraction over time periods is
the only thing that could possibly be suboptimal in the market.
By introducing an environmental instrument in the model, we can see if the mar-
ket brings the optimum to the economy without an impact on the inter-temporal
allocation of the resources. Here, a tax is levied on the firm with the amount that
corresponds to the negative impact of pollution. A traditional emission tax on each
pollutant is, hence, equal to
τt = δλ
Yt
Rt
. (28)
It is assumed that the tax is less than the direct marginal product of the resource
YR =
∂Yt
∂Rt
whereas it increases with the same rate. If tax is imposed, the firms
would not pay the marginal product YR for a unit of the resource, but only
pt = YR − τt. (29)
However, the change of the price for a resource does not affect the amount the
resource owners sell. They can expect that the tax will increase over time with
the proportion of YR. Following the Hotelling rule, the individual resource owner
will set the initial price in which the resource will be depleted when time goes
to infinity. It implies that the initial price of the resource will decrease with the
amount of the tax. It will lead to the same demand as before. Therefore, the levied
tax plays a role as a constant profit tax for the resource owners.
In other words, tax has no impact on the inter-temporal allocation of resources, and
no distortion takes place, not changing the behavior of the resource owners. It can
be concluded that a green tax does not affect the environmental condition and the
investment decisions. The market economy, therefore, behaves optimally without
a regulation.
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5 Welfare Analysis with Environmental Policy
In this section, I introduce the endogenous growth model constructed in Grimaud
and Rouge [2005]. Grimaud and Rouge [2005] focus on the presence of non-
renewable resources whose use in the production process generates a flow of pol-
lution that has negative impacts on the household’s utility.
First of all, the general solutions are presented. At the optimum, it is found that the
Hotelling rule is no longer a pure efficiency condition by introducing an externality
caused by the utilization of polluting non-renewable resources. Then, it is shown
that the market equilibrium features a socially suboptimal resource extraction rate.
The non-optimal condition in the equilibrium implies that an environmental in-
strument is necessary in order to correct the economic distortion and to make the
equilibrium condition closer to the optimality.
5.1 The Model
At each time, the production of basic good Yt depends on the amount of labor de-
voted to production LY,t, the stock of knowledgeAt and the flow of non-renewable
resources Rt:
Yt = F (LY,t, At, Rt). (30)
I denote the marginal productivities of LY,t, At and Rt by FL, FA and FR, respec-
tively. At each time, the stock of knowledge evolves as follows:
A˙t = q(At, LRD,t), (31)
where LRD,t is the amount of labor devoted to R&D. I denote by qA, qL the
marginal productivities. The technologies F (·, ·, ·) and q(·, ·) have constant returns
to scale in private inputs.
It is assumed that population is constant and normalized to one:
1 = LY,t + LRD,t. (32)
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In the resource sector, there is an initial finite stock S0, and at each time the amount
Rt is extracted according to the standard resource stock law of motion:
S˙t = −Rt. (33)
Produced goods are entirely consumed by the representative household at each time
t:
Yt = Ct. (34)
The instantaneous utility function of the household is affected by both consumption
Ct and the flow of pollution Pt. It is based on an assumption that pollution reduces
the household’s utility. Therefore, I set up the inter-temporal utility function as
U0 =
∞∫
0
U(Ct, Pt)e
−ρtdt. (35)
The partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to consumption Ct and
pollution Pt are denoted by UC and UP : UC > 0, and UP < 0.
The use of the non-renewable resource generates pollution in the production pro-
cess. In other words,
Pt = φ(Rt), (36)
where the derivative of φ is positive (φ′ > 0).
In this model, pollution does not have a negative effect on production like in the
model of Schou [2000]. Instead, the negative effect is felt by the households. For
example, if climate change is thought to cause natural disasters and high oil prices,
consumers will increasingly desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
5.2 Welfare Analysis
The social planner maximizes the inter-temporal utility function (35) subject to
constraints in (30)-(34) and (36). In order to find the solution to this problem, the
current-value Hamiltonian is defined as
H : U(F (LY,t, At, Rt), φ(Rt)) + µtq(At, LRD,t)− νtRt, (37)
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where µt and νt are the co-state variables. By eliminating the co-state variables,
the first order conditions reduce to the two following characteristic conditions:
ρ− U˙C
UC
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙L
qL
+
FAqL
FL
+ qA, (38)
and
F˙R
FR
− UPφ
′
UCFR
(
ρ−
˙UPφ′
UPφ′
)
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙L
qL
+
FAqL
FL
+ qA, (39)
where Xy¯ and Xy¯y are shorthand notations for ∂X∂y¯ and
∂2X
∂y¯∂y , respectively.
Both the conditions are derived in Appendix C.
Equations (38) and (39) are modifications of the Ramsey-Keynes model and Hotelling
rule6, respectively. Contrary to the standard neoclassical growth model, there is no
physical capital, but a stock At of knowledge. Moreover, the Hotelling rule is not
strictly a pure efficiency condition anymore when considering pollution. The term(
ρ− ˙UPφ′UPφ′
)
in (39) explains that extracting one unit of resource not only allows to
produce more, but also increases pollution that reduces utility.
5.3 Specification and Steady-State Analysis
In order to study the effect of an environmental instrument later, the standard spec-
ification needs to be considered. Production and R&D technologies have constant
returns to scale in private inputs. The production function is written as:
Yt = L
α
Y,tR
1−α
t A
ν
t , (40)
where 0 < α < 1 and ν > 0.
The stock of knowledge follows, with a constant σ > 0,
A˙t = σLRD,tAt. (41)
It is assumed that the level of emission is a linear function of extraction flows:
φ(Rt) = γRt, (42)
6The percentage change in net-price per unit of time should be equal to discount rate r in or-
der to maximize the present value of the resource capital over the extraction period in an efficient
exploitation of a non-renewable resource
(
p˙t
pt
= r
)
, [Hotelling, 1931].
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where γ > 0.
The utility of the representative household depends on consumption and pollution.
The household, hence, has the separable instantaneous utility function:
U(Ct, Pt) =
C1−t
1−  −
P 1+ωt
1 + ω
, (43)
where  > 0 and ω > 0.
When gzt is denoted as the growth rate,
z˙t
zt
, of any variable zt, from (40) the growth
rate of production gYt is
gYt = αgLY,t + (1− α)gRt + νσ(1− LY,t). (44)
For its derivation, see Appendix D.
Using (40)–(44), the following proposition is defined.
Proposition 1. At the steady-state optimum, the values of the quantities and growth
rates are given by
1. LoRD =
(σν − ρα)((1− α) + α+ ω)
σν(+ ω(1− α+ α)) ,
2. LoY = 1− LoRD,
3. goA = σLoRD,
4. goR = goP = goS =
(σν − ρα)(1− )
+ ω(1− α+ α) ,
5. goC = goY =
(σν − ρα)(1 + ω)
+ ω(1− α+ α) .
The superscript o is used for the optimum.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The initial quantities Y o0 and R
o
0 in this model are
Y o0 =C
o
0 = (L
o
Y )
α(−S0goR)1−α(A0)v, (45)
Ro0 =
P o0
γ
= −S0goR, (46)
given S0 and A0. (46) is readily obtained by dividing (33) by St.
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Figure 1: The existence of interior optimum. Reprinted from [Grimaud and Rouge,
2005].
The interior optimum exists when the following conditions hold:
LoRD <1, (47)
goR <0, (48)
while LoRD is positive. These conditions are fulfilled if
 > 1 (49)
and
ρ <
δν
α
. (50)
Figure 1 illustrates the existence of interior optimum. The derivation of the condi-
tions and their consequences are shown in Appendix F.
In this model, the parameter σ indicates the effectiveness of the R&D sector in
(41). It means that the higher σ is, the larger the labor in research LoRD and the
growth rate of knowledge goA are. On the other hand, the elasticity  of marginal
utility affects them in an opposite way. That is, as  increase, more utility is derived
from uniform consumption paths. It leads to the social planner to allocate less labor
to R&D and more to production. As a consequence, both the consumption growth
rate goC and the growth rate of resource extraction goR will be lowered.
In the standard literature of the endogenous growth model, an increase in ρ means
that current utility is more valued relative to utility in the future. Therefore, in
the steady-state, the growth rate of output will decrease, as more output today
means less tomorrow. According to this preference to consume more today, a social
planner will increase both the utilization of resource Ro and the amount of labor
LoY into the production process. It also leads to a decrease in LoRD and the growth
rate of knowledge in (31), A˙t = q(At, LRD,t).
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ξ = δ ξ =  ξ = ρ ξ = ω
∂LoRD
∂ξ > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
∂goA
∂ξ > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
∂goR
∂ξ < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0
∂goY
∂ξ > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
Table 4: The properties of the optimal path. The entries that are different from the
equilibrium path are marked in boldface.
In the framework of Grimaud and Rouge [2005], there is a fundamental difference
from the standard growth model in terms of the impact on goR by change in ρ. It
is based on that the utility function depends on not only an amount of consumption
but also pollution level. In case where current time is more valued (increase in
ρ), it also means that the current state of environment is valued more. That is, P o0
should decrease. It means that the first generation reduces the pollution to increase
welfare. As a social planner decreases the use of resource today and increases it
tomorrow, both goP and g
o
R increase contrary to the model without pollution.
In addition, the parameter ω in (43) reflects the household’s concern for a cleaner
environment. Thus, an increase in ω implies less pollution today, but more tomor-
row. It results in an increase of the growth rate of resource extraction. Then, to
make up for the fall in production with less resource use, the planner will increase
LoY today and decrease L
o
RD. Furthermore, from (40) we get g
o
Y = (1−α)goR+vgoA
at the steady state. The combination of both effects on goR and g
o
A by an increase
in ω results in a domination of the goR which leads to a rise in g
o
Y . The results are
summarized in Table 4.
5.4 Decentralized Equilibrium
5.4.1 Behavior of Agents and Equilibrium Conditions
I include private agents (the firms, households and government) into the model in
order to study the market equilibrium. It is assumed that firms do not take into
consideration the negative externality by the use of the non-renewable resources.
In order to correct the market failure, an environmental policy, a carbon tax, is
26
implemented.
Consumption good sector: At time t, the firm’s profit is:
piY,t = F (LY,t, At, Rt)− wtLY,t − pR,t(1 + σt)Rt, (51)
where wt, pR,t and σt are the wage, the resource price, and the unit tax on the
resource use at time t, respectively. I will use τt = 1 + σt for mathematical
convenience.
By differentiating piY,t with respect to LY,t and Rt, the first order conditions are
obtained:
FL = wt, (52)
FR = τtpR,t. (53)
It is assumed that knowledge is not embodied in intermediate goods and directly fi-
nanced. Moreover, I suppose that the government finances R&D activities entirely.
At each time the value of innovation is:
Vt =
∫ ∞
0
vse
− ∫ st rududs, (54)
where vs is the sum of the willingness to pay of the good sector vY,s and the R&D
sector vRD,s at time s, and ru is a discount rate at time u. The profit on innovations
is set up at time t as follows:
piRD,t = q(At, LRD,t)Vt − wtLRD,t. (55)
A necessary first-order condition for maximizing this profit function with respect
to LRD,t is
qLVt = wt. (56)
From the firm’s profit (51) and the profit on innovation (55), we get
vY,t =
∂piY,t
∂At
= FA,
vRD,t =
∂piRD,t
∂At
= qAVt. (57)
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Hence,
vt = FA + qAVt. (58)
Representative household: The representative household owns resource-extracting
firms. The inter-temporal utility function in (35) subject to
B˙t = wt + rtBt + pR,tRt − Tt − Ct
is maximized, where Bt denotes the stock of bonds at t, and Tt is a lump-sum tax
imposed by the government. It can be done by maximizing
H = U(Ct, Pt) + λ{wt + rtBt + pR,tRt − Tt − Ct}, (59)
where λ is the co-state variable. This maximization leads to the following condi-
tion:
ρ− UCCC˙ + UCP P˙
UC
= rt. (60)
Resource sector: The profit function in the competitive resource market is∫∞
t pR,sRse
− ∫ st rududs subject to S˙t = −Rt. The maximization problem yields
the standard equilibrium, the Hotelling rule:
p˙R,t
pR,t
= rt. (61)
Government: The government budget constraint is, for each time t,
Tt + σtpR,tRt = (vY,t + vRD,t)At. (62)
Remark 1. The characteristic equilibrium conditions under a market are
ρ− UCCC˙ + UCP P˙
UC
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙L
qL
+
FAqL
FL
+ qA, (63)
F˙R
FR
− τ˙t
τt
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙L
qL
+
FAqL
FL
+ qA. (64)
Proof. See Appendix G.
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Now, these two conditions can be compared to the optimal ones, (38) and (39).
Note the difference between (39) and (64). In the absence of the environmental
policy, the optimal Hotelling rule cannot be derived. This result comes from the
negative externality cost of pollution which is not included in the resource price in
this model. However, if the household’s utility does not depend on pollution (UP =
0), these two different characteristic conditions (39) and (64) become identical, and
the first best optimum is achieved.
5.4.2 Specification
Using (40)–(43), the conditions in (38) and (64), respectively, become
ρ+ (− 1)gYt = −gLY,t +
σν
α
LY,t and − gRt − gτt = −gLY,t +
σν
α
LY,t.
Together with (44), it leads to the growth rate of tax:
gτt =
gYt − gRt − νσ
α
. (65)
gYt and gRt are constant with respect to t if gτt is constant. Then, based on the
assumption that gτt is constant (= gτ ) , the steady-state equilibrium is characterized
by Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. At the steady-state equilibrium, the quantities and rates of growth
take the following values:
1. LeRD =
σν((1− α) + α)− αρ+ α(− 1)(1− α)gτ
σν
,
2. LeY =
σvα(− 1) + αρ− α(− 1)(1− α)gτ
σν
,
3. geA = σLeRD,
4. geR = geP = geS =
σν(1− )− ρ

− α+ 1− α

gτ ,
5. geC = geY =
σν − ρ

− 1− α

gτ .
The superscript e denotes the equilibrium.
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Figure 2: The existence of interior equilibrium. Reprinted from [Grimaud and
Rouge, 2005].
Similarly to the case of steady-state optimum, the initial quantities are
Y e0 =C
e
0 = (L
e
Y )
α(−S0geR)1−α(A0)ν , (66)
Re0 =
P e0
γ
= −S0geR, (67)
where at each time xet = x
e
0e
gext for any variable x.
It is assumed that there is no environmental policy (τt = 1). As done for the
optimal path, the set of parameter values is found in which 0 < LeRD < 1 and
geR < 0 such that the equilibrium path exists. To do so, 1. and 4. in Proposition 2
are used. The set is illustrated in Figure 2.
I now observe the impact of different parameters’ variation on LeRD, g
e
A, g
e
R and
geY . The properties of the equilibrium path are mostly similar to the properties of
the optimal one. There are only two differences. First, an increase in ρ decreases
the growth rate of the use of the non-renewable resources geR. If ρ is higher, the
representative household wants to consume more in current time. Correspondingly,
firms will produce more today using more resources and labor. Secondly, ω does
not affect the equilibrium variables. ω corresponds to the household’s concern for a
clean environment. Since the resource market does not take pollution into account,
pollution is not priced without an environmental policy, and, thus, ω has no effects
on market. The properties at the equilibrium are listed in Table 5.
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ξ = δ ξ =  ξ = ρ ξ = ω
∂LeRD
∂ξ > 0 < 0 < 0 = 0
∂geA
∂ξ > 0 < 0 < 0 = 0
∂geR
∂ξ < 0 < 0 < 0 = 0
∂geY
∂ξ > 0 < 0 < 0 = 0
Table 5: The properties of the equilibrium path. The entries that are different from
the optimal path are marked in boldface.
6 Impact of the Environmental Policy
6.1 General Analysis
Next, it is considered how the optimum path can be implemented. By comparing
(39) and (64), it is clear that the optimum path can be achieved if the growth rate
of the tax is levied by
goτ,t = −
UPφ
′
UCFR
(
˙UPφ′
UCφ′
− ρ
)
. (68)
The term− UPφ′UCFR can be seen as the relative disutility of resource extraction which
is, therefore, positive. That is, goτ,t has the same sign as the term
(
˙UPφ′
UCφ′ − ρ
)
. As
before, it is assumed that φ′ is constant (φ(Rt) = γRt), and U˙P = 0 meaning that
the disutility of pollution is constant. Then, goτ,t is negative. In this case, tax is
levied more today than tomorrow, which implies that the household postpones the
use of resource. Moreover, a rise in ρ causes goτ,t to decrease, which means that the
more people prefer the present, the more present pollution will be regulated by the
tax.
6.2 Optimum versus Equilibrium
I found that both the optimal path and the equilibrium path are jointly defined if
 > 1 and ρ < σν/α. Under these conditions, the following proposition can be
derived by comparing geR and goR, and geY and goY .
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Proposition 3.
geR < g
o
R (69)
geY < g
o
Y (70)
In this model, if there is no pollution, the decentralized equilibrium is a first best
optimum. If there is pollution, but no tax, the equilibrium does not change since
firms do not consider pollution. That is, the equilibrium is equivalent to the first
best optimum without pollution.
The paths taken at the equilibrium and optimum are illustrated in Figure 3. First,
the resource growth, or negative extraction, rate at time t at the equilibrium and
optimum are, respectively,
Ret = R
e
0e
geRt,
Rot = R
o
0e
goRt.
They are both exponentially decreasing functions with respect to t, since geR and
goR are negative due to the transversality conditions. Also, it should be reminded
that they are monotonically decreasing and approach zero as t→∞.
Given an initial amount of stock S0, the initial values of the two functions are
Re0 = −S0geR > Ro0 = −S0goR
due to the inequality in Proposition 3 ((A) in Figure 3). Hence, the equilibrium
path stays higher than the optimal path until the two curves cross each other at a
unique, finite moment t∗ ((B) in Figure 3):
t∗ =
logRe0 − logRo0
goR − geR
> 0,
since
logRe0 − logRo0 > 0,
and
goR − geR > 0.
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Figure 3: Optimum vs. Equilibrium without any public intervention. (t: time; Rt:
resource extraction) Reprinted from Grimaud and Rouge [2005].
At any time t > t∗, however, the equilibrium path always stays lower than the
optimal path, essentially approaching 0 faster ((C) in Figure 3).
Figure 3 shows the path of exhaustible resources at the optimum and decentral-
ized equilibrium, respectively. As people value their environmental condition more
heavily, the resource is depleted more slowly: goR increases. Conversely, when they
do not care about pollution, goR will decrease. Likewise, at the decentralized equi-
librium, the resource is extracted faster since the externality is not priced.
6.3 Impact of the Environmental Policy
Proposition 4.
- A change in the tax level has no impact on the equilibrium, and
- A change in the tax’s growth rate affects prices, quantities and growth rates.
When considering a market for which the demand is D = D(pτ), and the supply
S is fixed, we have D(pτ) = S. p is price, and τ = 1 + σ, where σ is a unit tax. It
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leads to pτ = D−1(S) which is constant. Hence, an increase in τ does not affect
the quantities but only results in a decrease in p.
On the other hand, a change in gτ affects the entire path. Using 1.–5. in Proposi-
tion 2, we can see how gτ impact the variations of the parameters in Table 6.
ξ = LeRD ξ = g
e
A ξ = g
e
R ξ = g
e
Y
∂ξ
∂gτ
> 0 if  > 1 > 0 if  > 1 < 0 < 0
Table 6: Effect of the environmental policy
If gτ decreases, it leads to an increase in geR, which lowers the initial value R
e
0.
Then, the slope of the equilibrium path becomes less steep, which indicates that
the resource is extracted is at a lower path.
From the production function (40), Yt = LαY,tR
1−α
t A
ν
t , and the two first-order
conditions (52)–(53), FL = wt and FR = τtpR,t, the equilibrium prices are given
by
wt =α(L
e
Y )
α−1(Ret )
1−α(Aet )
ν , (71)
pR,t =(1− α)(LeY )α(Ret )−α(Aet )ν(τ0egτ t)−1. (72)
The price ratio τtpR,twt is a decreasing function of gτ . Thus, the lower gτ is, the
higher τtpR,t is, compared to the wage. It implies that if a tax is levied more today,
the price firms should pay more for the use of resource today. It causes firms to use
the resource less today and more tomorrow.
This effect of the tax can be illustrated by considering the equilibrium path of
Ret (See Figure 4). The decrease in the growth rate of tax ∆gτ < 0 implies the
increase in geR (∆g
e
R > 0), since
∂geR
∂gτ
< 0 in Table 6. The initial value R˜e0 of the
new resource growth rate is, then,
R˜e0 = −S0(geR + ∆geR) < Re0,
which means that the initial value decreases toward the optimal path ((A) in Fig-
ure 4).
As mentioned previously, the resource growth rate is a monotonically decreasing
function. A finite moment t∗ at which the old Ret and the new R˜et cross each other
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Figure 4: Impact of the environmental policy in a decrease in gτ . Reprinted from
Grimaud and Rouge [2005].
is
t∗ =
logRe0 − log R˜e0
∆geR
> 0,
since
logRe0 > log R˜
e
0
and
∆geR > 0.
The existence of a unique, finite t∗ implies that the new path will approach zero
more slowly than the original equilibrium path ((B) in Figure 4), hence, resulting in
a slower extraction of the resource. Therefore, it may be said that an environmental
instrument brings the equilibrium condition closer to the optimal condition.
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7 Comparison and Empirical Analysis of Innovation
Schou [2000] introduces an endogenous growth model with a constraint of non-
renewable resources causing pollution problems. He examines how the results of
the growth model are affected by the inclusion of pollution and resource scarcity.
In the framework of Schou [2000], the externality has negative effects on the pro-
duction process.
The results are different from typical findings in several ways. In this model, the
pollution declines over time, because there is a need to save the non-renewable
resources. Moreover, it turns out that the negative effect of the pollution on the
production process does not prevent the economy from reaching the optimal growth
path. It is even shown that the more important is the negative impact of pollution
on the production, the higher the optimal long-run growth will be.
In contrast, Grimaud and Rouge [2005] take into consideration the effect generated
by the pollution on the household’s utility. In this context, it was shown that there
are differences between the equilibrium and optimal condition. It analyze that
resources are extracted too rapidly in the steady-state equilibrium compared to the
optimal rate.
Subsequently, it argues that the environmental policy is a necessary instrument in
order to correct the equilibrium condition and make it closer to optimality. Another
contribution is the result that the level of tax does not matter, but the distortion can
only be corrected by choosing an optimal growth rate of the tax.
There exist two common assumptions in Grimaud and Rouge [2005] and Schou
[2000]. One is that pollution is considered as a flow variable, not a stock. Another
is that firms do not take into account the negative externality since their contribution
to the aggregate pollution level is negligible.
The main difference between the two papers concerns the assumed effect of pol-
lution. In Grimaud and Rouge [2005], pollution is considered to affect the house-
hold’s utility. According to the analysis of Grimaud and Rouge [2005], if pollution
affects the household’s utility, a disparity takes place between the socially opti-
mal growth path and the market economy. It is the so-called economic distortion.
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Therefore, an environmental policy is aimed at correcting the distortion introduced
at the equilibrium.
On the other hand, Schou [2000] focuses on the negative impact of pollution on the
production process. In the framework of Schou [2000], a market economy without
any regulation leads to the optimum in the presence of a pollution externality. He,
therefore, concludes that environmental policy is unnecessary, considering the fact
that the resource stock is finite, and the externality has no impact on the optimal
inter-temporal allocation of the resource. It can be summarized that the market
achieves the optimum as firms respond to pollution by themselves, by using less
resources in the production process.
The approach of Grimaud and Rouge [2005] to the endogenous growth theory ap-
pears to be more useful than the simpler approach of Schou [2000] in addressing
the question of sustainable development. For it reflects the current trend, in which
consumers increasingly concern about the environmental condition, and the insti-
tutions of international cooperation to implement a sustainable growth policy are
organized.
According to the assumption of Grimaud and Rouge [2005], the utility function
depending on both consumption and pollution reflects social phenomena. It is im-
portant to consider the fact that consumers become increasingly aware of environ-
mental problems. For instance, it can be intuitively understood that climate change,
which causes the natural disaster, and high oil price encourage consumers to reduce
the utilization of polluting non-renewable resources. Another example is the find-
ing reported by OECD [2011b] that the suitable knowledge and information about
the environmental problems have profound effect on the behavior of consumers.
OECD [2011b] presents the following remark on how the public policies affect the
household behavior, or utility:
As consumers account for 60% of final consumption in the OECD
area, their purchasing decisions have a major impact on the extent to
which markets can work to promote green products. However, their
decisions to buy green depends on the financial cost of green options
and the infrastructure to support such choices; the quality and reli-
ability of information on the products, and the knowledge consumers
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have of environmental issues. Industry, government, and civil society
can play an important role in creating the enabling environment for
consumers to make greener purchasing choices.
Recent OECD work on environmental policy and household be-
havior is exploring the factors driving household’s environment-related
decisions in order to inform policy design and implementation. A sur-
vey of over 10,000 households across 10 OECD countries (Australia,
Canada, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Korea, Mexico, the Nether-
lands, Norway, and Sweden) confirms the impact of economic incen-
tives on household behavior and the important complementary role
played by information-based measures such as energy-efficiency la-
beling of appliances and housing.
The findings confirm the importance of providing the right eco-
nomic incentive to spur behavioral changes, in particular in energy
and water savings. The evidence also indicates that pricing consump-
tion by volume is partially useful; the mere act of metering and intro-
ducing a price on the use of natural resources has an effect on people’s
decision making. The survey indicates that softer instruments, such as
information to consumers and public education, can play a substan-
tial complementary role. Eco labels are particularly useful, as long
as they are clear and comprehensible, and that they identify both pub-
lic and private benefits. These soft instruments need to be given close
attention in developing more comprehensive strategies for influencing
consumer and household environmental behavior.
In addition, the following empirical result presents evidence that it is not suffi-
cient to passively count on technological change to solve environmental problems.
There are extensive studies focusing on the effect of policy instruments on the in-
novation of energy-efficiency technologies. In particular, recent empirical papers
have presented evidences showing that energy price affects the choice of types of
innovations.
Newell et al. [1999] study the specific case of the air-conditioning industry. They
examine how much home appliances had responded to the change of energy price
with respect to energy efficiency between 1958 and 1993 using a model of induced
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Table 7: Induced-Innovation Regression Results. Reprinted from Popp [2002].
Unweighted Weighted
Independent Variables Stock of Patents Stock of Patents
Constant -9.016 (-12.362) -7.311 (-46.625)
Energy prices 0.028 (2.146) 0.060 (2.852)
Lagged knowledge stock 0.719 (25.612) 0.838 (72.323)
Government R&D 0.006 (0.968) -0.009 (-1.741)
Truncation error 1.924 (2.445) -1.203 (-5.054)
Lambda 0.933 (18.905) 0.829 (13.662)
Long-run energy elasticity 0.421 0.354
Long-run government R&D elasticity 0.085 -0.052
Median lag 13.81 4.86
Mean lag 9.92 3.71
GMM criterion 86.560 93.421
Number of technology groups 11 11
Notes: This table shows the induced-innovation regression results. Lagged party of the
president and lagged government R&D are used as instruments for government R&D.
A time trend and lagged values of other exogenous variables are used as instruments
for the knowledge stocks. t-statistics appear in parentheses below estimates. Data are
from 1971-91.
innovation. In their framework, it is found that the changes in energy price induced
both the commercialization of new models and the elimination of old models.
In detail, they find that the technological change in air conditioners was biased
against the energy efficiency in the 1960s when the energy price was falling. How-
ever, this phenomenon was reversed after the two energy shocks in 1970s. In addi-
tion, it is found that the energy efficiency in 1993 would have been approximately
one-quarter to one-half lower in air conditioners if the energy price had remained
at their 1973 levels.
Popp [2002] takes into consideration the effect of energy price on energy-saving
innovations using U.S. patent data from 1970 to 1994. For that purpose, the set
of subclassifications is sorted into eleven distinct technology group. It includes six
groups pertaining to the energy supply, such as solar energy, and five groups related
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to energy demand, such as methods of reusing industrial waste heat.
The dependent variables of the innovation regression are the ratios of the number of
successful non-government U.S. patent applications for technology field i in year t
over the total number of successful non-government U.S. patent applications in the
same year. In addition, the following variables are used in the model as independent
variables: (1) the price of energy in that year; (2) the stock of knowledge that
had been accumulated by the previous year; and (3) technology-specific variables,
government R&D expenditures, and a dummy for the lagged political party of the
president.
The regression results are presented in Table 7. The first column shows the result
using an unweighted count of past patents as the knowledge stock. The second col-
umn presents the result using a weighted stock of patents to represent knowledge.
The regression results show that both price and the stock of knowledge available to
inventors play an important role in inducing new energy innovations. The coeffi-
cients of the lagged knowledge stock are positive and significant in each regression.
The most significant result is the strong, positive impact energy price has on new
innovations. This finding suggests that environmental tax and regulations not only
reduce pollution by shifting a behavior away from polluting activities but also
encourage the development of new technologies that make pollution control less
costly in the long run. The results also make it clear that it is not enough to sim-
ply rely on technological change as a panacea for environmental problems. There
must be some mechanisms in place that encourage new innovation. To sum up, in-
novation is necessary, but it is not sufficient for unlimited sustainable growth when
environmental pollution and non-renewable resources are taken into account.
The analysis of Grimaud and Rouge [2005] uncovers some conditions under which
growth can possibly be sustained with the constraints imposed by the finiteness
of resource, but it has not addressed the critical questions of what policies might
implement the optimal sustainable growth paths that have been found. In the next
chapter, environmental policy instruments will be compared with respect to their
effect on technological change and investigated in terms of which policy is more
appropriate to induce the innovation.
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8 Environmental Policy Instruments and Their Current
Status
Many industrialized countries have already implemented environmental policy in-
struments to reduce climate change. The objectives of these actions are to achieve
the Kyoto commitments and long-term emission reduction targets. These targets
are aimed to spur investment to lower carbon outcome and build a climate resilient
economy. Table 8 shows the examples of policy tools for climate change mitigation
at the national level.
Credible and long-term price on carbon emission across the economy through
market-based instruments, such as emission trading schemes or carbon taxes, is
necessary to drive investment in low-carbon technologies. It penalizes carbon-
intensive technologies and processes, creates markets for low-carbon technologies
and stimulates action in the energy, industry, transport, and agriculture sectors.
Putting a price tag on carbon can also help trigger green innovations and enhance
energy efficiency [OECD, 2010].
8.1 Emission Trading Scheme
Under emission trading systems (ETS) a government sets a limit, or a cap, on the
amount of a pollutant that can be emitted. The limit is allocated or sold to firms
in the form of emission permits which represent the right to emit or discharge a
specific volume of a specified pollutant. Firms are required to hold the number of
permits equivalent to their emission. The total number of permits cannot exceed
the cap, limiting total emissions. Firms that need to increase their emission must
buy permits from those who require fewer permits. In effect, a buyer is paying
charge for polluting, while a seller is being rewarded for having reduced emissions
[OECD, 2011a].
ETS is becoming increasingly important in the climate policy portfolio. In the last
ten years, almost all Annex I parties have either established or strengthened the
existing trading schemes and are in some ways participating in either national or
international carbon markets [UNFCCC, 2011, Hood, 2010]. Nevertheless, there
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Price-based Taxes on CO2 emissions.
instruments Taxes on inputs or outputs of process
(energy or vehicles).
Removal of environmentally harmful subsidies
(e.g., for fossil fuels).
Subsidies for emissions-reducing activities.
Emissions trading systems
(cap-and-trade or Baseline-and-credit).
Command and Technology standards.
Control Performance standards.
Regulations Prohibition or mandating of certain products or practices.
Reporting requirements.
Requirements for operating certification.
Land-use planning, zoning.
Technology A robust intellectual property rights system.
policies Public and private R&D funding.
support Public procurement of low-carbon products and services.
Green certificates
(e.g., renewable portfolio standard).
Feed-in tariffs for electricity from renewable.
Public investment in infrastructure for
new low-carbon technologies.
Policies to remove financial barriers to green technology
Capacity building for the workforce, infrastructure development.
Information and Rating and labeling programs.
voluntary Public information campaigns.
approaches Education and training.
Product certification and labeling.
Award schemes.
Table 8: Examples of policy tools for climate change mitigation. Reprinted from
de Serres et al. [2010].
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are several issues that need to be considered in order to increase the environmental
effectiveness and economic efficiency or permit trading [OECD, 2008a]. The ini-
tial allocation of the emission allowance, and ways of limiting the transaction costs
are the remaining issues of this system.
The world’s largest emission trading system is the EU-ETS7. It has led to building
an international carbon market. Another good example is the New Zealand ETS.
It covers all six Kyoto Protocol Gases8 from energy, transport, industry, waste,
synthetic gases, and forestry.
8.2 Carbon Tax
Carbon tax is a cost effective way to reduce emission. The tax provides incentives
for polluters and resource users to change their behavior today. It also provides
long-term incentives to innovate [OECD, 2008b].
Carbon tax is usually applied to fuel and electricity so that their price reflects their
CO2-emission factors. Carbon tax is currently used in 10 OECD countries, with
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
leading these efforts since the early 1990s [OECD, 2009]. Sweden was one of the
first countries to introduce a carbon tax in 1991, with a general level of the tax
increasing over the years to reach EUR 111 per ton in 2010. A positive side effect
of the Climate Change Levy in the U.K., which taxes industrial and commercial
GHG-emitting power production, has been to stimulate innovation [OECD, 2010].
Those companies that pay a lower than normal tax rate under the negotiated Cli-
mate Change Agreements9 have registered fewer patents for inventions to tackle
7Launched in January 2005, the EU-Emissions Trading Scheme is the world’s largest trading
schemes, operating in 30 countries and covering more than 10,900 installations in Europe, such as
power stations, combustions plants, oil refineries, iron and steel works and factories making cement,
glass, lime bricks, ceramics, pulp and paper. The EU-ETS faced significant challenges in its first two
phases (2005-2007 and 2008-2012), such as over-allocation of permits, windfall profits for electricity
generators due to free allocation systems and price volatility, all of which reduced the efficiency of
the scheme. However, it has shown that the price signal has been effective in promoting low carbon
pathways [OECD, 2011a].
8Six Kyoto Protocol gases are CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCS , PFCS and SF6.
9It entitles those companies in agreements to an 80% discount off the tax liability, provided they
adopt a binding target on their energy use.
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climate change than those that pay the full levy. In Canada, British Colombia (BC)
has had a carbon tax in place since 2008. The carbon tax is a critical component of
Climate Action Plan in BC in reducing GHG emissions by 33% by 2020 [OECD,
2011a].
8.3 Command-and-Control Instrument
Regulations can be appropriate when a market cannot provide price signals to indi-
viduals or organizations that reflect the costs of polluting behavior. In the transport
sector, for instance, CO2-emission standards are increasingly mandatory and have
been widely implemented in many countries.
Regulations are used to reduce the emission of gases that are subject to the Mon-
treal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. For example, Australia
has the Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gases Management regula-
tion; the European Union has directives on fluorinated gases, mobile air condition-
ing, and integrated pollution prevention and control; and the United States has Sig-
nificant New Alternatives Program. Their regulations have also long contributed
to landfill methane emission reductions as well as industrial N2O and HFC reduc-
tion. For instance, industrial N2O emission in France was cut by 90% in the 1990s
through those schemes [OECD, 2011a].
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9 Conclusion
This paper aimed to investigate the incentives provided by the environmental pol-
icy instruments to encourage the adoption of an advanced abatement technology.
My point of departure was to analyze the impact of pollution generated from ex-
haustible resources in the endogenous growth model.
First, the following problem was considered: what is the proper treatment of tech-
nological change? I presented the limitation of the neoclassical model which
takes the rate of technological change as being determined exogenously by non-
economic forces. Without technological change an economy can grow for a while,
but eventually the growth will stop with a diminishing marginal product of capital.
With this limitation, I focused on showing that it is more plausible to build a growth
model including endogenous technological change. Different processes were pre-
sented which induce technological progress and industrial innovations firms make:
price-induced technological change, R&D, and learning-by-doing.
Therefore, I introduced the two endogenous growth models incorporating exhaustible
resource depletion proposed by Schou [2000] and Grimaud and Rouge [2005]. An
economy achieves the optimum without an environmental policy in the framework
of Schou [2000]. On the other hand, Grimaud and Rouge [2005] showed that there
is a difference between the equilibrium and optimum.
Considering the perspective of Grimaud and Rouge [2005], this non-optimality
justifies the implementation of an environmental policy so that the environmental
policy corrects the distortion in the model caused by polluting emission. A unit
tax on polluting resources was chosen to deal with the problem. Applying it to the
model, it was shown that the growth rate of tax matters, not its level in order to
correct the distortion in the economy.
In Section 7, these two approaches, by Schou [2000] and Grimaud and Rouge
[2005], were compared. They shared two common assumptions that pollution is a
flow, not a stock and that the contribution of a single firm on the aggregate pollu-
tion level is negligible. The major difference between the two models came from
their approaches to the effect of the pollution. Schou [2000] concerned the im-
pact on the production process whereas Grimaud and Rouge [2005] focused on the
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effect on the household’s utility. By comparing Schou [2000] and Grimaud and
Rouge [2005], it was shown that the approach of Grimaud and Rouge [2005] is
more plausible in the current condition of society and the changing behavior of
households.
In the last section, the empirical studies were presented to show that an environ-
mental regulation is an effective tool to reduce pollution and induce technological
change. Moreover, some of existing environmental policy instruments adopted in
developed countries were introduced.
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A Exogenous Growth Rate
This section presents the Ramsey model [Ramsey, 1928] , as elaborated by Cass
[1964] and Koopmans [1963]. Technological progress is added to the Cass-Koopmans-
Ramsey model to make growth sustainable in the long run.
Consider a representative who lives infinitely. The utility function is
W =
∞∫
0
e−ρtU(Ct)dt, (73)
where {Ct}, U(·) and ρ are the time path of consumption, an instantaneous utility
function and a positive rate of time preference, respectively.
The special isoelastic case is assumed:
Ut =
C1−t − 1
1−  , (74)
where 0 ≤  < 1. In this case, individuals have the same elasticity of substitution
between present and future consumption. It means that the household desire to
have smooth consumption over time.
The aggregate production function can be written as F (Kt, AtLt) where At is an
exogenous productivity parameter that reflects the state of technological progress
at time t, and it grows at the constant exponential rate g.
Suppose the aggregate production function in the Cobb-Douglas form
F (Kt, AtLt) = (AtLt)
1−αKαt . (75)
This form shows that technological progress is equivalent to an increase in the
effective supply of labor AtLt which grows at the rate of growth of population
plus the growth rate of productivity n + g. To simplify the analyses we assume
a constant labor force L = 1. Then the aggregate production function becomes
F (Kt, At).
We will maximize W subject to the constraint that consumption plus investment
equals the net national product:
K˙t = F (Kt, At)− δKt − Ct. (76)
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As the utility of the representative households should be maximized, this problem
is traditionally written in terms of the Hamiltonian:
H : U(Ct) + λ [F (Kt, At)− δKt − Ct] ,
The necessary condition for maximizing this with respect to Ct is, then,
∂H
∂Ct
= 0. (77)
It shows that the marginal utility of consumption equals the shadow value of in-
vestment is:
U ′(Ct) = λ. (78)
The state variable Kt has the condition
λ˙ = ρλ− ∂H
∂Kt
, (79)
or equivalently
ρλ = λ(FK(Kt, At)− δ) + λ˙, (80)
where FK = ∂F∂K .
Finally, the transversality condition10 must hold:
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtKtλ = 0. (81)
Substituting for λ = U ′(Ct) in (80), we can get
U ′′(Ct)
U ′(Ct)
C˙t = ρ− [FK(Kt, At)− δ]. (82)
Suppose we define the marginal rate of return r(Kt) as the extra net output that the
household could get from a marginal unit of capital:
r(Kt) ≡ ∂
∂Kt
[F (Kt, At)−Ktδ] = FK(Kt, At)− δ. (83)
According to the utility function, the preceding equation (80) becomes
C˙t
C t
=
FK(Kt, At)− δ − ρ

. (84)
10It states that inputs used for the production, either the capital stock or natural resource must be
zero or it must be valueless not leaving anything valuable unconsumed before you die.
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We have F (K,A) = AF (K/A, 1). Differentiating both sides with respect to K,
we get FK(K,A) = FK(K/A, 1) which shows that the marginal product of capital
is a function of the ratio K/A. According to this, the assumption that F exhibits
constant returns implies that the marginal product FK depends on the ratio K/A.
Therefore, Kt and At can both grow at the exogenous rate g presented.
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B Growth Rates under Endogenous Model
Let us start by restating the production function (85):
Yt = AtK
α
t (uthtL
β
t )R
γ
t P
−δ
t h
θ
t (85)
with
A,α, β, γ, δ, θ ≥ 0.
We get
(β + γ)g = (β + θ)ght + (γ − δλ)gRt
⇐⇒ g = β + θ
β + γ
ght +
γ − δλ
β + γ
gRt
⇐⇒ (β + γ)g = (β + θ)ght + (γ − δλ)gRt (86)
by differentiating the production function with respect to time t. It should be noted
that Pt was replaced by DRλt according to (2) which states
Pt = DR
λ
t .
With the identity−g = gµt in (15), the growth rate of the shadow value of natural
resource νt given in (16) becomes
gνt = ρ =− g + g − gRt
=(1− )g − gRt , (87)
where ρ is a shorthand notation defined in (10). This is equivalent to
gRt = (1− )g − ρ. (88)
From (8) it is easy to see that
ηtht =
µtβYt
utBt
.
Plugging this into (11), we get
gηt =
η˙t
ηt
= ρ− β + θ
β
utBt − (1− ut)Bt (89)
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which is the growth rate of the shadow value of the human capital.
The following identities follow from (4):
ght =
h˙t
ht
= (1− ut)Bt, (90)
ut =1− ght
Bt
, (91)
where ght is the growth rate of the human capital ht. Using the first identity (90),
(89) becomes
gηt =
η˙t
ηt
= ρ− β + θ
β
utBt − ght . (92)
Equating the above formula of gηt with
gηt = gµt + g − ght ,
which comes from (17), we get
(1− )g = ρ− β + θ
β
(Bt − ght),
where we used the second identity (91). Equivalently, we may write
ght = Bt +
β(1− )
β + θ
g − βρ
β + θ
. (93)
Plugging (88) and (93) into (86), we get
g =
(β + θ)Bt − (β + γ − δλ)ρ
δλ+ (β + γ − δλ)
which is the growth rate of the production presented earlier in (19). Similarly,
we obtain the following growth rates of the human capital and natural resource by
simply replacing g in (88) and (93) with (19):
gh =
(β + θ)(β + γ + (1− )δλ)Bt − β(β + γ)ρ
(β + γ)(δλ+ (β + γ − δλ)) ,
gR =
(1− )(β + θ)Bt − (β + γ)ρ
δλ+ (β + γ − δλ) .
As usual, the time index t of the variables h and R have been omitted as this
derivation assumes the steady-state.
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C Non-specified Optimality Conditions
Here the derivation of the characteristic conditions (38) and (39) from the Hamil-
tonian in (37) is presented.
Given the Hamiltonian H , the first-order conditions ∂H∂LRD,t = 0 and
∂H
∂Rt
= 0 yield
− UCFLµtqL = 0 ⇐⇒ µtqL = UCFL ⇐⇒ µt = UCFL
qL
(94)
UCFR + UPφ
′ − νt = 0 ⇐⇒ νt = UCFR + UPφ′. (95)
Furthermore, ∂H∂At = ρµt − µ˙t and ∂H∂st = ρνt − ν˙t result in
UCFA + µtqA = ρµt − µ˙t ⇐⇒ µ˙t
µt
= ρ− FAqL
FL
− qA (96)
0 = ρνt − ν˙t ⇐⇒ ν˙t
νt
= ρ (97)
Differentiating a logarithm of (94) with respect to time, we get
µ˙t
µt
=
U˙C
UC
+
F˙L
FL
− q˙L
qL
. (98)
Before proceeding, it should be reminded that U˙C = UCCC˙ + UCP P˙ and U˙P =
UPCC˙ + UPP P˙ . Together with (96), it follows that
ρ− FAqL
FL
− qA = U˙C
UC
+
F˙L
FL
− q˙L
qL
⇐⇒ ρ− U˙C
UC
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙L
qL
+
FAqL
FL
+ qA
which is the first characteristic condition given in (38).
The derivation of a logarithm of (95) with respect to time is
ν˙t
νt
=
d
dt (UCFR + UPφ
′)
UCFR + UPφ′
=
1
UCFR + UPφ′
(
UCFR
(
U˙C
UC
+
F˙R
FR
)
+ UPφ
′
(
U˙P
UP
+
φ˙′
φ′
))
(99)
With (97), one obtains
ρ
(
UCFR + UPφ
′) = UCFR( U˙C
UC
+
F˙R
FR
)
+ UPφ
′
(
U˙P
UP
+
φ′
φ
)
⇐⇒ ρ− U˙C
UC
=
F˙R
FR
+
UPφ
′
UCFR
(
U˙P
UP
+
φ′
φ
− ρ
)
(100)
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With the first characteristic condition (38), (100) becomes
F˙L
FL
− q˙L
qL
+
FAqL
FL
+ qA =
F˙R
FR
+
UPφ
′
UCFR
(
˙UPφ′
UPφ′
− ρ
)
,
where ˙UPφ′ = U˙Pφ′ + UP φ˙′ was used. It is easy to see that this is equivalent to
(39) with a simple re-arrangement.
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D Growth Rate of Production
Given the production function (40), the growth rate gYt =
Y˙t
Yt
can be computed by
the logarithmic differentiation:
gYt =
Y˙t
Yt
=
d
dt
(α logLY,t + (1− α) logRt + ν logAt)
= α
L˙Y,t
LY,t
+ (1− α)R˙t
Rt
+ ν
A˙t
At
.
By replacing A˙tAt with σLRDt according to (41), one gets
gYt = αgLY,t + (1− α)gRt + νσ(1− LY,t),
where gLY,t and gRt are the growth rate of the labor in the production and the
resource input, respectively.
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E Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition. At the steady-state optimum, the values of the quantities and growth
rates are given by
1. LoRD =
(σν − ρα)((1− α) + α+ ω)
σν(+ ω(1− α+ α)) ,
2. LoY = 1− LoRD,
3. goA = σLoRD,
4. g0R = goP = goS =
(σν − ρα)(1− )
+ ω(1− α+ α) ,
5. goC = goY =
(σν − ρα)(1 + ω)
+ ω(1− α+ α) .
Proof. It should be noticed that the following equations hold under (40)–(43) to-
gether with the characteristic conditions (38) and (39):
ρ+ (− 1)gYt = −gLY,t +
σν
α
LY,t, (101)
− gRt +
(γRt)
1+ω
(1− α)Y 1−t
(ρ− ωgRt) = −gLY,t +
σν
α
LY,t, (102)
where, as before, gzt denotes the growth rate of any variable zt.
When all the growth rates are constant, solving for LY,t and logarithmically differ-
entiating (101) with respect to time imply that goLY = g
o
LR
= 0 and that LY,t = LoY
and LRD,t = LoRD, considering (101)–(102) and (44). Hence, at the steady state, 2.
and 3. immediately follow from (32) and (41).
Furthermore, as there is no population growth (i.e., LY,t + LRD,t = 1, (32)) at the
steady state, the following equations follow from (101), (102) and (44):
ρ+ (− 1)goY =
σν
α
(1− LoRD) (103)
− goR +
(γRt)
1+ω
(1− α)Y 1−t
(ρ− ωgoR) =
σν
α
(1− LoRD) (104)
goY = (1− α)goR + σνLoRD, (105)
where the last equation can be rearranged into
−g
o
Y
α
+
1− α
α
goR +
σν
α
=
σν
α
(1− LoRD), (106)
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and from (103) and (106)
goR = −
σν − ρα
1− α +
1− (1− )α
1− α g
o
Y (107)
follows.
Adding goR to the both sides of (104) and taking its logarithmic derivative with
respect to time gives
goY =
1 + ω
1−  g
o
R. (108)
Plugging (108) into (107) results in
goR =
(σν − ρα)(1− )
+ ω(1− α+ α) . (109)
After rearranging (105) into LoRD =
goY −(1−α)goR
σν and plugging (108),
LoRD =
(1− α) + ω + α
σν(1− ) g
o
R
which leads to 1. after plugging in (109).
Since the variables Rt, Pt and S˙t have the same growth rate according to (33) and
(36), 4. clearly follows from (109). Then, 5. holds trivially by plugging 4. into
(108).
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F Existence of the Steady-state Optimum
The first transversality condition is
lim
t→∞µtA
o
t e
−ρt = 0
which is equivalent to
lim
t→∞µ0e
gµtAo0e
goAte−ρt = 0
lim
t→∞µ0A
o
0e
(gµt+g
o
A−ρ)t = 0.
This transversality condition is satisfied when
gµt + g
o
A − ρ < 0. (110)
From (96), we know that the growth rate of the co-state variable µt is
gµt =
µ˙t
µt
= ρ− FAqL
FL
− qA
which can be re-written as
gµt = ρ−
δν
α
+ δLoRD
ν − α
α
. (111)
By plugging (111) into (110), we get
δν
α
(1− LoRD) < 0
which holds if and only if LoRD is lower than one as in (47).
Similarly, the second transversality condition
lim
t→∞ ν0e
gνt tSo0e
goSte−ρt = 0
holds when
gνt + g
o
S − ρ < 0. (112)
By plugging (97) into (112) we see that
ρ+ goS − ρ = goS < 0
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which is equivalent to the condition (48).
Due to the condition that LoRD is positive, we can see from 1. of Proposition 1 that
δν − ρα > 0,
which leads to ρ < δνα . Furthermore, from 4. of Proposition 1 with the condition
(48), it is clear that
(δν − ρα)(1− ) < 0
which is equivalent to
 > 1
since δν − ρα > 0.
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G Proof of Remark 1
By combining the derivatives of (54) and (56) with respect to time t we get
w˙t
wt
= rt − vt
Vt
+
q˙L
qL
⇐⇒ rt = w˙t
wt
+
vt
Vt
− q˙L
qL
. (113)
From (58),
vt
Vt
=
FA
Vt
+ qA
=
qLFA
FL
+ qA,
where the identity in (56) has been used. Plugging this into (113),
rt =
F˙L
FL
− q˙L
qL
+
qLFA
FL
+ qA,
where we used FL = wt from (52).
Replacing rt in (60) with the above equation leads to the characteristic equilibrium
condition (63).
According to the Hotelling rule in (61) together with (53), we know that
rt =
p˙Rt
pRt
=
F˙R
FR
− τ˙t
τt
.
By replacing rt in the first condition with this, we get the second condition (64).
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